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The structures for the expression of fault-tolerance provisions into the application software are the
central topic of this paper. Structuring techniques answer the questions “How to incorporate fault-
tolerance in the application layer of a computer program” and “How to manage the fault-tolerant
code”. As such, they provide means to control complexity, the latter being a relevant factor for the
introduction of design faults. This fact and the ever increasing complexity of today’s distributed
software justify the need for simple, coherent, and effective structures for the expression of fault-
tolerance in the application software. In this text we first define a “base” of structural attributes
with which application-level fault-tolerance structures can be qualitatively assessed and compared
with each other and with respect to the above mentioned needs. This result is then used to provide
an elaborated survey of the state-of-the-art of application-level fault-tolerance structures.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: D.2.7 [Software Engineering]: Software Architectures—
Languages; Domain-specific architectures; D.3.2 [Programming Languages]: Language Clas-
sifications—Specialized application languages; C.4 [Performance of Systems]: Fault tolerance;
K.6.3 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]: Software Management—
Software development ; Software maintenance; D.2.2 [Software Engineering]: Design Tools and
Techniques—Software libraries; D.2.7 [Software Engineering]: Distribution, Maintenance, and
Enhancement—Portability
General Terms: Design, Languages, Reliability
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Language support for software-implemented fault tolerance,
separation of design concerns, software fault tolerance, reconfiguration and error recovery.
1. INTRODUCTION
Research in fault-tolerance has focused for decades on hardware fault-tolerance, i.e.,
on devising a number of effective and ingenious hardware solutions to cope with
physical faults. For several years this approach was considered as the only one
effective solution to reach the required availability and data integrity demanded
by ever more complex computer services. We now know that this is not true.
Hardware fault-tolerance is an important requirement to tackle the problem, but
cannot be considered as the only way to go: Adequate tolerance of faults and end-
to-end fulfilment of the dependability design goals of a complex software system
must include means to avoid, remove, or tolerate faults that operate at all levels,
including the application layer.
While effective solutions have been found, e.g., for the hardware [Pradhan 1996],
the operating system [Denning 1976], or the middleware [(OMG) 1998] layers, the
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problem of an effective system structure to express fault-tolerance provisions in
the application layer of computer programs is still an open one. To the best of our
knowledge, no detailed critical survey of the available solutions exists. Through this
paper the authors attempt to fill in this gap. Our target topic is linguistic structures
for application-level fault-tolerance, so we do not tackle herein other important
approaches that do not operate at the application-level, such as the fault-tolerance
models based on transparent task replication [Guerraoui and Schiper 1997], as e.g.
in CORBA-FT [(OMG) 1998]. Likewise this text does not include approaches such
as the one in [Ebnenasir and Kulkarni 2004], where the focus is on automating the
transformation of a given fault-intolerant program into a fault-tolerant program.
The reason behind this choice is that, due to their exponential complexity, those
methods are currently only effective when the state space of the target program is
very limited [Kulkarni and Arora 2000].
Another important goal of this text is to pinpoint the consequences of inefficient
solutions to the aforementioned problem as well as to increase the awareness of
a need for an optimal solution to it: Indeed, the current lack of a simple and
coherent system structure for software fault-tolerance engineering able to provide
the designer with effective support towards fulfilling goals such as maintainability,
re-usability, and service portability of fault-tolerant software manifests itself as a
true bottleneck for system development.
The structure of this paper is as follows: in Sect. 2 we explain the reasons behind
the need for system-level fault-tolerance. There we also provide a set of key desirable
attributes for a hypothetically perfect linguistic structure for application-level fault-
tolerance (ALFT). Section 3 is a detailed survey of modern available solutions,
each of which is qualitatively assessed with respect to our set of attributes. Some
personal considerations and conjectures on what is missing and possible ways to
achieve it are also part of this section. Section 4 finally summarizes our conclusions
and provides a comparison of the reviewed approaches.
2. RATIONALE
If in the early days of modern computing it was to some extent acceptable that
outages and wrong results occurred rather often1, being the main role of computers
basically that of a fast solver of numerical problems, today the criticality associated
with many tasks dependent on computers requires strong guarantees for properties
such as availability and data integrity.
A consequence of this growth in complexity and criticality is the need for
—techniques to assess and enhance, in a justifiable way, the reliance to be placed
on the services provided by computer systems, and
—techniques to lessen the risks associated with computer failures, or at least bound
the extent of their consequences.
1This excerpt from a report on the ENIAC activity [Weik 1961] gives an idea of how dependable
computers were in 1947: “power line fluctuations and power failures made continuous operation
directly off transformer mains an impossibility [. . . ] down times were long; error-free running
periods were short [. . . ]”. After many considerable improvements, still “trouble-free operating
time remained at about 100 hours a week during the last 6 years of the ENIAC’s use”, i.e., an
availability of about 60%!
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Fig. 1. Laprie’s fault classification scheme.
This paper focuses in particular on fault-tolerance, that is, how to ensure a service
up to fulfilling the system’s function even in the presence of “faults” [Aviz˘ienis et al.
2004; Aviz˘ienis et al. 2004]. A fault is a defect, or an imperfection, or a lack in a
system’s hardware or software component. It is generically defined as the adjudged
or hypothesised cause of an error. Faults can have their origin within the system
boundaries (internal faults) or outside, i.e., in the environment (external faults).
In particular, an internal fault is said to be active when it produces an error, and
dormant (or latent) when it does not. A dormant fault becomes an active fault when
it is activated by either its process or the environment. Fault latency is defined as
either the length of time between the occurrence of a fault and the appearance of
the corresponding error, or the length of time between the occurrence of a fault and
its removal.
Faults can be classified according to so-called viewpoints [Laprie 1992; Laprie
1995; Laprie 1998]—phenomenological cause, nature, phase of creation or occur-
rence, situation with respect to system boundaries, persistence. Not all combina-
tions can give rise to a fault class—this process only defines 17 fault classes, sum-
marised in Fig. 1. These classes have been further partitioned into three groups,
known as combined fault classes:
Physical faults:.
—Permanent, internal, physical faults. This class concerns those faults that have
their origin within hardware components and are continuously active. A typical
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example is given by the fault corresponding to a worn out component.
—Temporary, internal, physical faults (also known as intermittent faults) [Bon-
davalli et al. 1997]. These are typically internal, physical defects that become
active depending on a particular pointwise condition.
—Permanent, external, physical faults. These are faults induced on the system by
the physical environment.
—Temporary, external, physical faults (also known as transient faults) [Bondavalli
et al. 1997]. These are faults induced by environmental phenomena, e.g., EMI.
Design faults:.
—Intentional, though not malicious, permanent / temporary design faults. These
are basically trade-offs introduced at application-layer design time. A typical
example is insufficient dimensioning (underestimations of the size of a given field
in a communication protocol2, and so forth).
—Accidental, permanent, design faults (also called systematic faults, or Bohrbugs):
flawed algorithms that systematically turn into the same errors in the presence of
the same input conditions and initial states—for instance, an unchecked divisor
that can result in a division-by-zero error.
—Accidental, temporary design faults (known as Heisenbugs, for “bugs of Heisen-
berg”, after their elusive character): while systematic faults have an evident,
deterministic behaviour, these bugs depend on subtle combinations of the sys-
tem state and environment.
Interaction faults:.
—Temporary, external, operational, human-made, accidental faults. These include
operator faults, in which an operator does not correctly perform his or her role
in system operation.
—Temporary, external, operational, human-made, non-malicious faults: “neglect,
interaction, or incorrect use problems” [Sibley 1998]. Examples include poorly
chosen passwords and bad system parameter setting.
—Temporary, external, operational, human-made, malicious faults. This class in-
cludes the so-called malicious replication faults, i.e., faults that occur when repli-
cated information in a system becomes inconsistent, e.g. because the processes
that are supposed to provide identical results no longer do so.
2.1 A Need for Software Fault-Tolerance
Research in fault-tolerance concentrated for many years on hardware fault-tolerance,
i.e., on devising a number of effective and ingenious hardware structures to cope
with faults [Johnson 1989]. For some time this approach was considered as the only
one needed in order to reach the requirements of availability and data integrity de-
manded by modern complex computer services. Probably the first researcher who
realized that this was far from being true was B. Randell who in [Randell 1975]
questioned hardware fault-tolerance as the only approach to pursue—in the cited
paper he states:
2A noteworthy example is given by the bad dimensioning of IP addresses, which gave raise to
IPv6.
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“Hardware component failures are only one source of unreliability in
computing systems, decreasing in significance as component reliability
improves, while software faults have become increasingly prevalent with
the steadily increasing size and complexity of software systems.”
Indeed most of the complexity supplied by modern computing services lies in
their software rather than in the hardware layer [Lyu 1998a; Lyu 1998b; Huang
and Kintala 1995; Wiener 1993; Randell 1975]. This state of things could only
be reached by exploiting a powerful conceptual tool for managing complexity in
a flexible and effective way, i.e., devising hierarchies of sophisticated abstract ma-
chines [Tanenbaum 1990]. This translates into implementing software with high-
level computer languages lying on top of other software strata—the device drivers
layers, the basic services kernel, the operating system, the run-time support of the
involved programming languages, and so forth.
Partitioning the complexity into stacks of software layers allowed the implementor
to focus exclusively on the high-level aspects of their problems, and hence it allowed
them to manage greater and greater degrees of complexity. But though made
transparent, this complexity is still part of the overall system being developed.
A number of complex algorithms are executed by the hardware at the same time,
resulting in the simultaneous progress of many system states—under the hypothesis
that no involved abstract machine nor the actual hardware be affected by faults.
Unfortunately, as in real life faults do occur, the corresponding deviations are likely
to jeopardise the system’s function, also propagating from one layer to the other,
unless appropriate means are taken to avoid in the first place, or to remove, or to
tolerate these faults. In particular, faults may also occur in the application layer,
that is, in the abstract machine on top of the software hierarchy3. These faults,
possibly having their origin at design time, or during operation, or while interacting
with the environment, are not different in the extent of their consequences from
those faults originating, e.g., in the hardware or the operating system. A well known
example of this is the case of the Ariane 5 flight 501 [Inquiry Board Report 1996], in
which the consequences of a fault in the application ultimately brought to a system
crash. In general we observe how the higher the level of abstraction, the higher
the complexity of the algorithms into play and the consequent error proneness of
the involved (real or abstract) machines. As a conclusion, full tolerance of faults
and complete fulfilment of the dependability design goals of a complex software
application must include means to avoid, remove, or tolerate faults working at all
levels, including the application layer. This paper focuses on run-time detection
and recovery of faults through mechanisms residing in or cooperating with the
application layer.
2.2 Software Fault-Tolerance in the Application Layer
The need of software fault-tolerance provisions, located in the application layer,
is supported by studies that showed that the majority of failures experienced by
modern computer systems are due to software faults, including those located in
3In what follows, the application layer is to be intended as the programming and execution context
in which a complete, self-contained program that performs a specific function directly for the user
is expressed or is running.
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the application layer [Lyu 1998a; Lyu 1998b; Aviz˘ienis et al. 2004; Aviz˘ienis et al.
2004]; for instance, NRC reported that 81% of the total number of outages of US
switching systems in 1992 were due to software faults [NRC 1993]. Moreover, mod-
ern application software systems are increasingly networked and distributed. Such
systems, e.g., client-server applications, are often characterised by a loosely coupled
architecture whose global structure is in general more prone to failures4. Due to
the complex and temporal nature of interleaving of messages and computations in
distributed software systems, no amount of verification, validation and testing can
eliminate all faults in an application and give complete confidence in the availabil-
ity and data consistency of applications of this kind [Huang and Kintala 1995].
Under these assumptions, the only alternative (and effective) means for increasing
software reliability is that of incorporating in the application software provisions of
software fault-tolerance [Randell 1975].
Another argument that justifies the addition of software fault-tolerance means in
the application layer is given by the widespread adoption of reusable software com-
ponents. Approaches such as object-orientation, component-based middleware and
service-orientation have provided the designer with effective tools to compose sys-
tems out of e.g., COTS object libraries, third-party components, and web services.
For instance, many object-oriented applications are indeed built from reusable com-
ponents the sources of which are unknown to the application developers. The above
mentioned approaches fostered the capability of dealing with higher levels of com-
plexity in software and at the same time eased and therefore encouraged software
reuse. This is having a big, positive impact on development costs, but turns the
application into a sort of collection of reused, pre-existing “blocks” made by third
parties. The reliability of these components and therefore their impact on the over-
all reliability of the user application is often unknown, up to the point that Green
defines as “art” creating reliable applications using off-the-shelf software compo-
nents [Green 1997]. The case of the Ariane 501 flight is a well-known example
that shows how improper reuse of software may have severe consequences5 [Inquiry
Board Report 1996].
But probably the most convincing argument for not excluding the application
layer from a fault-tolerance strategy is the so-called “end-to-end argument”, a sys-
tem design principle introduced by Saltzer, Reed and Clark [1984]. This principle
states that, rather often, functions such as reliable file transfer, can be completely
and correctly implemented only with the knowledge and help of the application
standing at the endpoints of the underlying system (for instance, the communica-
tion network).
This does not mean that everything should be done at the application level—
fault-tolerance strategies in the underlying hardware and operating system can
have a strong impact on a system’s performance. However, an extraordinarily
4As Leslie Lamport efficaciously synthesised in his quotation, “a distributed system is one in which
I cannot get something done because a machine I’ve never heard of is down”.
5The Ariane 5 programme reused the long-tested software used in Ariane 4. Such software had
been thoroughly tested and was compliant to Ariane 4 specifications. Unfortunately, specifications
for Ariane 5 were different. A dormant design fault had never been unravelled simply because the
operating conditions of Ariane 4 were different from those of Ariane 5. This failure entailed a loss
of about 370 million Euros [Le Lann 1996].
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reliable communication system, that guarantees that no packet is lost, duplicated,
or corrupted, nor delivered to the wrong addressee, does not reduce the burden of
the application program to ensure reliability: for instance, for reliable file transfer,
the application programs that perform the transfer must still supply a file-transfer-
specific, end-to-end reliability guarantee.
Hence one can conclude that:
Pure hardware-based or operating system-based solutions to fault-tole-
rance, though often characterised by a higher degree of transparency, are
not fully capable of providing complete end-to-end tolerance to faults
in the user application. Furthermore, relying solely on the hardware
and the operating system develops only partially satisfying solutions;
requires a large amount of extra resources and costs; and is often char-
acterised by poor service portability [Saltzer et al. 1984; Siewiorek and
Swarz 1992].
2.3 Strategies, Problems, and Key Properties
The above conclusions justify the strong need for ALFT; as a consequence of this
need, several approaches to ALFT have been devised during the last three decades
(see Chapter 3 for a brief survey). Such a long research period hints at the com-
plexity of the design problems underlying ALFT engineering, which include:
(1) How to incorporate fault-tolerance in the application layer of a computer pro-
gram.
(2) Which fault-tolerance provisions to support.
(3) How to manage the fault-tolerant code.
Problem 1 is also known as the problem of the system structure to software
fault-tolerance, first proposed by B. Randell in [1975]. It states the need of
appropriate structuring techniques such that the incorporation of a set of fault-
tolerance provisions in the application software might be performed in a simple,
coherent, and well structured way. Indeed, poor solutions to this problem result
in a huge degree of code intrusion: in such cases, the application code that
addresses the functional requirements and the application code that addresses the
fault-tolerance requirements are mixed up into one large and complex application
software.
—This greatly complicates the task of the developer and requires expertise in both
the application domain and in fault-tolerance. Negative repercussions on the
development times and costs are to be expected.
—The maintenance of the resulting code, both for the functional part and for the
fault-tolerance provisions, is more complex, costly, and error prone.
—Furthermore, the overall complexity of the software product is increased—which
is detrimental to its resilience to faults.
One can conclude that, with respect to the first problem, an ideal system structure
should guarantee an adequate Separation between the functional and the
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fault-tolerance Concerns (sc).
Moreover, the design choice of which fault-tolerance provisions to support can be
conditioned by the adequacy of the syntactical structure at “hosting” the various
provisions. The well-known quotation by B. L. Whorf efficaciously captures this
concept:
“Language shapes the way we think, and determines what we can think
about.”
Indeed, as explained in Sect. 2.3.1, a non-optimal answer to Problem 2 may
—require a high degree of redundancy, and
—rapidly consume large amounts of the available redundancy,
which at the same time would increase the costs and reduce reliability. One can
conclude that, devising a syntactical structure offering straightforward support to
a large set of fault-tolerance provisions, can be an important aspect of an ideal sys-
tem structure for ALFT. In the following this property will be called Syntactical
Adequacy (sa).
Finally, one can observe that another important aspect of an ALFT architec-
ture is the way the fault-tolerant code is managed, at compile time as well as at
run time. Evidence for this statement can be found by observing how a number
of important choices pertaining to the adopted fault-tolerance provisions, such as
the parameters of a temporal redundancy strategy, are a consequence of an anal-
ysis of the environment in which the application is to be deployed and is to run6.
In other words, depending on the target environments, the set of (external) im-
pairments that might affect the application can vary considerably. Now, while it
may be in principle straightforward to port an existing code to another computer
system, porting the service supplied by that code may require a proper adjust-
ment of the above mentioned choices, namely the parameters of the adopted provi-
sions [De Florio and Blondia 2007a]. Effective support towards the management of
the parametrisation of the fault-tolerant code and, in general, of its maintenance,
could guarantee fault-tolerance software reuse. Therefore, off-line and on-line
(dynamic) management of fault-tolerance provisions and their parameters may be
an important requirement for any satisfactory solution of Problem 3. As further
motivated in Sect. 2.3.1, ideally, the fault-tolerant code should adapt itself to the
current environment. Furthermore, any satisfactory management approach should
not overly increase the complexity of the application—which would be detrimental
to dependability. Let us call this property Adaptability (a).
Let us refer collectively to properties sc, sa and a as to the structural attributes
of ALFT.
The various approaches to ALFT surveyed in Section 3 provide different system
structures to solve the above mentioned problems. The three structural attributes
are used in that section in order to provide a qualitative assessment with respect to
6For instance, if an application is to be moved from a domestic environment to another one
characterised by an higher electro-magnetic interference (EMI), it is reasonable to assume that,
e.g., the number of replicas of some protected resource should be increased accordingly.
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various application requirements. The structural attributes constitute, in a sense,
a base with which to perform this assessment. One of the major conclusions of
that survey is that none of the surveyed approaches is capable to provide the best
combination of values of the three structural attributes in every application domain.
For specific domains, such as object-oriented distributed applications, satisfactory
solutions have been devised at least for sc and sa, while only partial solutions exist,
for instance, when dealing with the class of distributed or parallel applications not
based on the object model.
The above matter of facts has been efficaciously captured by Lyu, who calls this
situation “the software bottleneck” of system development [Lyu 1998b]: in other
words, there is evidence of an urgent need for systematic approaches to assure
software reliability within a system [Lyu 1998b] while effectively addressing the
above problems. In the cited paper, Lyu remarks how “developing the required
techniques for software reliability engineering is a major challenge to computer
engineers, software engineers and engineers of related disciplines.”
2.3.1 Fault-Tolerance, Redundancy, and Complexity. A well-known result by
Shannon [1993] tells us that, from any unreliable channel, it is possible to set up
a more reliable channel by increasing the degree of information redundancy. This
means that it is possible to trade off reliability and redundancy of a channel. The
authors observe that the same can be said for a fault-tolerant system, because fault-
tolerance is in general the result of some strategy effectively exploiting some form
of redundancy—time, information, and/or hardware redundancy [Johnson 1989].
This redundancy has a cost penalty attached, though. Addressing a weak failure
semantics, able to span many failure behaviours, effectively translates into higher
reliability—nevertheless,
(1) it requires large amounts of extra resources, and therefore implies a high cost
penalty, and
(2) it consumes large amounts of extra resources, which translates into the rapid
exhaustion of the extra resources.
For instance, Lamport et al. [1982] set the minimum level of redundancy required
for tolerating Byzantine failures to a value that is greater than the one required for
tolerating, e.g., value failures. Using the simplest of the algorithms described in the
cited paper, a 4-modular-redundant (4-MR) system can only withstand any single
Byzantine failure, while the same system may exploit its redundancy to withstand
up to three crash faults—though no other kind of fault [Powell 1997]. In other
words:
After the occurrence of a crash fault, a 4-MR system with strict Byzan-
tine failure semantics has exhausted its redundancy and is no more de-
pendable than a non-redundant system supplying the same service, while
the crash failure semantics system is able to survive to the occurrence of
that and two other crash faults. On the other hand, the latter system,
subject to just one Byzantine fault, would fail regardless its redundancy.
We can conclude that for any given level of redundancy trading complexity of
failure mode against number and type of faults tolerated may be an important
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capability for an effective fault-tolerant structure. Dynamic adaptability to dif-
ferent environmental conditions7 may provide a satisfactory answer to this need,
especially when the additional complexity does not burden (and jeopardise) the ap-
plication. Ideally, such complexity should be part of a custom architecture and not
of the application. On the contrary, the embedding in the application of complex
failure semantics, covering many failure modes, implicitly promotes complexity, as
it may require the implementation of many recovery mechanisms. This complex-
ity is detrimental to the dependability of the system, as it is in itself a significant
source of design faults. Furthermore, the isolation of that complexity outside the
user application may allow cost-effective verification, validation and testing. These
processes may be unfeasible at the application level.
The authors conjecture that a satisfactory solution to the design problem of
the management of the fault-tolerant code (presented in Sect. 2.3) may translate
into an optimal management of the failure semantics (with respect to the involved
penalties). In other words, we conjecture that linguistic structures characterised
by high adaptability (a) may be better suited to cope with the just mentioned
problems.
3. CURRENT APPROACHES TO APPLICATION-LEVEL FAULT-TOLERANCE
One of the conclusions drawn in Sect. 1 is that the system to be made fault-
tolerant must include provisions for fault-tolerance also in the application layer of
a computer program. In that context, the problem of which system structure to
use for ALFT has been proposed. This section provides a critical survey of the
state-of-the-art on embedding fault-tolerance means in the application layer.
According to the literature, at least six classes of methods, or approaches, can be
used for embedding fault-tolerance provisions in the application layer of a computer
program. This section describes these approaches and points out positive and
negative aspects of each of them with respect to the structural attributes defined in
Sect. 2.3 and to various application domains. A non-exhaustive list of the systems
and projects implementing these approaches is also given. Conclusions are drawn
in Sect. 4, where the need for more effective approaches is recognised.
Two of the above mentioned approaches derive from well-established research in
software fault-tolerance—Lyu [1998b; 1996; 1995] refers to them as single-version
and multiple-version software fault-tolerance. They are dealt with in Sect. 3.1. A
third approach, described in Sect. 3.2, is based on metaobject protocols. It is de-
rived from the domain of object-oriented design and can also be used for embedding
services other than those related to fault-tolerance. A fourth approach translates
into developing new custom high-level distributed programming languages or en-
hancing pre-existent languages of that kind. It is described in Sect. 3.3. Aspect-
oriented programming as a fault-tolerance structuring technique is discussed in
Sect. 3.4. Finally, Sect. 3.5 describes an approach, based on a special recovery task
monitoring the execution of the user task.
7The following quote by J. Horning [1998] captures very well how relevant may be the role of the
environment with respect to achieving the required quality of service: “What is the most often
overlooked risk in software engineering? That the environment will do something the designer
never anticipated”.
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3.1 Single- and Multiple-Version Software Fault-Tolerance
A key requirement for the development of fault-tolerant systems is the availability
of replicated resources, in hardware or software. A fundamental method em-
ployed to attain fault-tolerance is multiple computation, i.e., N -fold (N ≥ 2)
replications in three domains:
Time. That is, repetition of computations.
Space. I.e., the adoption of multiple hardware channels (also called “lanes”).
Information. That is, the adoption of multiple versions of software.
Following Aviz˘ienis [1985], it is possible to characterise at least some of the ap-
proaches towards fault-tolerance by means of a notation resembling the one used
to classify queueing systems models [Kleinrock 1975]:
nT/mH/pS,
the meaning of which is “n executions, on m hardware channels, of p programs”.
The non-fault-tolerant system, or 1T/1H/1S, is called simplex in the cited paper.
3.1.1 Single-Version Software Fault-Tolerance. Single-version software fault-to-
lerance (SV) is basically the embedding into the user application of a simplex system
of error detection or recovery features, e.g., atomic actions [Jalote and Campbell
1985], checkpoint-and-rollback [Elnozahy et al. 2002], or exception handling [Cris-
tian 1995]. The adoption of SV in the application layer requires the designer to
concentrate in one physical location, namely the source code of the application,
both the specification of what to do in order to perform some user computation
and the strategy such that faults are tolerated when they occur. As a result, the size
of the problem addressed is increased. A fortiori, this translates into an increase
of size of the user application, which induces loss of transparency, maintainability,
and portability while increasing development times and costs.
A partial solution to this loss in portability and these higher costs is given by the
development of libraries and frameworks created under strict software engineering
processes. In the following, two examples of this approach are presented—the
EFTOS library and the SwiFT system.
3.1.1.1 The EFTOS library. EFTOS [De Florio et al. 1998a] (that is “Embed-
ded, Fault-Tolerant Supercomputing”) is the name of ESPRIT-IV project 21012.
Aims of this project were to investigate approaches to add fault-tolerance to embed-
ded high-performance applications in a flexible and cost-effective way. The EFTOS
library has been first implemented on a Parsytec CC system [Parsytec 1996], a
distributed-memory MIMD supercomputer consisting of processing nodes based on
PowerPC 604 microprocessors at 133MHz, dedicated high-speed links, I/O modules,
and routers.
Through the adoption of the EFTOS library, the target embedded parallel ap-
plication is plugged into a hierarchical, layered system whose structure and basic
components (depicted in Fig. 2) are:
—At the base level, a distributed net of “servers” whose main task is mimicking
possibly missing (with respect to the POSIX standards) operating system func-
tionalities, such as remote thread creation;
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—One level upward (detection tool layer), a set of parameterisable functions manag-
ing error detection, referred to as “Dtools”. These basic components are plugged
into the embedded application to make it more dependable. EFTOS supplies
a number of these Dtools, e.g., a watchdog timer thread and a trap-handling
mechanism, plus an API for incorporating user-defined EFTOS-compliant tools;
—At the third level (control layer), a distributed application called “DIR net”
(its name stands for “detection, isolation, and recovery network”) is used to
coherently combine the Dtools, to ensure consistent fault-tolerance strategies
throughout the system, and to play the role of a backbone handling information
to and from the fault-tolerance elements [De Florio et al. 2000; De Florio 1998].
The DIR net can be regarded as a fault-tolerant network of crash-failure detectors
connected to other peripheral error detectors. Each node of the DIR net is
“guarded” by an <I’m Alive> thread that requires the local component to send
periodically “heartbeats” (signs of life). A special component, called RINT,
manages error recovery by interpreting a custom language called RL [De Florio
and Deconinck 2002; De Florio 1997a].
—At the fourth level (application layer), the Dtools and the components of the DIR
net are combined into dependable mechanisms i.e., methods to guarantee fault-
tolerant communication [Efthivoulidis et al. 1998], tools implementing a virtual
Stable Memory [De Florio et al. 2001], a distributed voting mechanism called
“voting farm” [De Florio 1997b; De Florio et al. 1998a; De Florio et al. 1998b],
and so forth;
—The highest level (presentation layer) is given by a hypermedia distributed appli-
cation which monitors the structure and the state of the user application [De Flo-
rio et al. 1998]. This application is based on a special CGI script [Kim 1996],
called DIR Daemon, which continuously takes its inputs from the DIR net, trans-
lates them into HTML, and remotely controls a Netscape browser [Zawinski 1994]
so that it renders these HTML data.
3.1.1.2 The SwiFT System. SwiFT [Huang et al. 1996] stands for Software
Implemented Fault-Tolerance. It includes a set of reusable software components
(watchd, a general-purpose UNIX daemon watchdog timer; libft, a library of
fault-tolerance methods, including single-version implementation of recovery blocks
and N -version programming (see Sect. 3.1.2); libckp, i.e., a user-transparent
checkpoint-and-rollback library; a file replication mechanism called REPL; and addre-
juv, a special “reactive” feature of watchd [Huang et al. 1995] that allows for soft-
ware rejuvenation8. SwiFT has been successfully used and proved to be efficient
and economical means to increase the level of fault-tolerance in a software sys-
tem where residual faults are present and their toleration is less costly than their
full elimination [Lyu 1998b]. A relatively small overhead is introduced in most
cases [Huang and Kintala 1995].
8Software rejuvenation [Huang et al. 1995; Bao et al. 2003] offers tools for periodical and graceful
termination of an application with immediate restart, so that possible erroneous internal states,
due to transient faults, be wiped out before they turn into a failure.
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Fig. 2. The structure of the EFTOS library. Light gray has been used for the operating system
and the user application, while dark gray layers pertain EFTOS.
Fig. 3. A fault-tolerant program according to a SV system.
3.1.1.3 Conclusions. Figure 3 synthesizes the main characteristics of the SV ap-
proach: the functional and the fault-tolerant code are intertwined and the developer
has to deal with the two concerns at the same time, even with the help of libraries
of fault-tolerance provisions. In other words, SV requires the application developer
to be an expert in fault-tolerance as well, because he (she) has to integrate in the
application a number of fault-tolerance provisions among those available in a set
of ready-made basic tools. His (hers) is the responsibility for doing it in a coher-
ent, effective, and efficient way. As it has been observed in Sect. 2.3, the resulting
code is a mixture of functional code and of custom error-management code that
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does not always offer an acceptable degree of portability and maintainability. The
functional and non-functional design concerns are not kept apart with SV, hence
one can conclude that (qualitatively) SV exhibits poor separation of concerns (sc).
This in general has a bad impact on design and maintenance costs.
As to syntactical adequacy (sa), we observe that following SV the fault-tolerance
provisions are offered to the user though an interface based on a general-purpose
language such as C or C++. As a consequence, very limited sa can be achieved by
SV as a system structure for ALFT.
Furthermore, no support is provided for off-line and on-line configuration of the
fault-tolerance provisions. Consequently we regard the adaptability (a) of this
approach as insufficient.
On the other hand, tools in SV libraries and systems give the user the ability
to deal with fault-tolerance “atoms” without having to worry about their actual
implementation and with a good ratio of costs over improvements of the depend-
ability attributes, sometimes introducing a relatively small overhead. Using these
toolsets the designer can re-use existing, long tested, sophisticated pieces of software
without having each time to “re-invent the wheel”.
Finally, it is important to remark that, in principle, SV poses no restrictions on
the class of applications that may be tackled with it.
3.1.2 Multiple-Version Software Fault-Tolerance. This section describes multiple-
version software fault-tolerance (MV), an approach which requires N (N ≥ 2) in-
dependently designed versions of software. MV systems are therefore xT/yH/NS
systems. In MV, a same service or functionality is supplied by N pieces of code
that have been designed and developed by different, independent software teams9.
The aim of this approach is to reduce the effects of design faults due to human mis-
takes committed at design time. The most used configurations are NT/1H/NS,
i.e., N sequentially applicable alternate programs using the same hardware channel,
and 1T/NH/NS, based on the parallel execution of the alternate programs on N ,
possibly diverse, hardware channels.
Two major approaches exist: the first one is known as recovery block [Randell
1975; Randell and Xu 1995], and is dealt with in Sect. 3.1.2.1. The second ap-
proach is the so-called N -version programming [Aviz˘ienis 1985; Aviz˘ienis 1995]. It
is described in Sect. 3.1.2.2.
3.1.2.1 The Recovery Block Technique. Recovery Blocks are usually implemented
as NT/1H/NS systems. The technique addresses residual software design faults. It
aims at providing fault-tolerant functional components which may be nested within
a sequential program. Other versions of the approach, implemented as 1T/NH/NS
systems, are suited for parallel or distributed programs [Scott et al. 1985; Randell
and Xu 1995].
The recovery blocks technique is similar to the hardware fault-tolerance approach
known as “stand-by sparing”, which is described, e.g., in [Johnson 1989]. The
9This requirement is well explained by Randell [1975]: “All fault-tolerance must be based on
the provision of useful redundancy, both for error detection and error recovery. In software the
redundancy required is not simple replication of programs but redundancy of design.” Footnote 5
briefly reports on the consequences of a well known case of redundant design.
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Fig. 4. The recovery block model with two alternates. The execution environment is charged with
the management of the recovery cache and the execution support functions (used to restore the
state of the application when the acceptance test is not passed), while the user is responsible for
supplying both alternates and the acceptance test.
approach is summarised in Fig. 4: on entry to a recovery block, the current state
of the system is checkpointed. A primary alternate is executed. When it ends,
an acceptance test checks whether the primary alternate successfully accomplished
its objectives. If not, a backward recovery step reverts the system state back to
its original value and a secondary alternate takes over the task of the primary
alternate. When the secondary alternate ends, the acceptance test is executed
again. The strategy goes on until either an alternate fulfils its tasks or all alternates
are executed without success. In such a case, an error routine is executed. Recovery
blocks can be nested—in this case the error routine invokes recovery in the enclosing
block [Randell and Xu 1995]. An exception triggered within an alternate is managed
as a failed acceptance test. A possible syntax for recovery blocks is as follows:
ensure acceptance test
by primary alternate
else by alternate 2
.
.
else by alternate N
else error
Note how this syntax does not explicitly show the recovery step that should be
carried out transparently by a run-time executive.
The effectiveness of recovery blocks rests to a great extent on the coverage of
the error detection mechanisms adopted, the most crucial component of which is
the acceptance test. A failure of the acceptance test is a failure of the whole
recovery blocks strategy. For this reason, the acceptance test must be simple, must
not introduce huge run-time overheads, must not retain data locally, and so forth.
It must be regarded as the ultimate means for detecting errors, though not the
exclusive one. Assertions and run-time checks, possibly supported by underlying
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layers, need to buttress the strategy and reduce the probability of an acceptance
test failure. Another possible failure condition for the recovery blocks approach is
given by an alternate failing to terminate. This may be detected by a time-out
mechanism that could be added to recovery blocks. This addition obviously further
increases the complexity.
The SwiFT library that has been described in Sect. 3.1.1 (p. 12) implements
recovery blocks in the C language as follows:
#include <ftmacros.h>
...
ENSURE(acceptance-test) {
primary alternate;
} ELSEBY {
alternate 2;
} ELSEBY {
alternate 3;
}
...
ENSURE;
Unfortunately this approach does not cover any of the above mentioned require-
ments for enhancing the error detection coverage of the acceptance test. This would
clearly require a run-time executive that is not part of this strategy. Other solu-
tions, based on enhancing the grammar of pre-existing programming languages such
as Pascal [Shrivastava 1978] and Coral [Anderson et al. 1985], have some impact
on portability. In both cases, code intrusion is not avoided. This translates into
difficulties when trying to modify or maintain the application program without in-
terfering “much” with the recovery structure, and vice-versa, when trying to modify
or maintain the recovery structure without interfering “much” with the application
program. Hence one can conclude that recovery blocks are characterised by unsat-
isfactory values of the structural attribute sc. Furthermore, a system structure for
ALFT based exclusively on recovery blocks does not satisfy attribute sa10. Finally,
regarding attribute a, one can observe that recovery blocks are a rigid strategy that
does not allow off-line configuration nor (a fortiori) code adaptability.
On the other hand, recovery blocks have been successfully adopted throughout
30 years in many different application fields. It has been successfully validated by
a number of statistical experiments and through mathematical modelling [Randell
and Xu 1995]. Its adoption as the sole fault-tolerance means, while developing
complex applications, resulted in some cases [Anderson et al. 1985] in a failure
coverage of over 70%, with acceptable overheads in memory space and CPU time.
A negative aspect in any MV system is given by development and maintenance
costs, that grow as a monotonic function of x, y, z in any xT/yH/zS system.
10Randell himself states that, given the ever increasing complexity of modern computing, there
is still an urgent need for “richer forms of structuring for error recovery and for design diver-
sity” [Randell and Xu 1995].
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Fig. 5. The N -Version Software model when N = 3. The execution environment is charged with
the management of the decision algorithm and with the execution support functions. The user is
responsible for supplying the N versions. Note how the Decision Algorithm box takes care also of
multiplexing its output onto the three hardware channels—also called “lanes”.
3.1.2.2 N-Version Programming. N -Version Programming (NVP) systems are
built from generic architectures based on redundancy and consensus. Such systems
usually belong to class 1T/NH/NS, less often to class NT/1H/NS. NVP is defined
by its author [Aviz˘ienis 1985] as “the independent generation of N ≥ 2 functionally
equivalent programs from the same initial specification.” These N programs, called
versions, are developed for being executed in parallel. This system constitutes a
fault-tolerant software unit that depends on a generic decision algorithm to deter-
mine a consensus or majority result from the individual outputs of two or more
versions of the unit.
Such a strategy (depicted in Fig. 5) has been developed under the fundamental
conjecture that independent designs translate into random component failures—
i.e., statistical independence. Such a result would guarantee that correlated fail-
ures do not translate into immediate exhaustion of the available redundancy, as
it would happen, e.g., using N copies of the same version. Replicating software
would also mean replicating any dormant software fault in the source version—see,
e.g., the accidents with the Therac-25 linear accelerator [Leveson 1995] or the Ari-
ane 5 flight 501 [Inquiry Board Report 1996]. According to Aviz˘ienis, independent
generation of the versions significantly reduces the probability of correlated fail-
ures. Unfortunately a number of experiments [Eckhardt et al. 1991] and theoretical
studies [Eckhardt and Lee 1985] have shown that this assumption is not always
correct.
The main differences between recovery blocks and NVP are:
—Recovery blocks (in its original form) is a sequential strategy whereas NVP allows
concurrent execution;
—Recovery blocks require the user to provide a fault-free, application-specific, ef-
fective acceptance test, while NVP adopts a generic consensus or majority voting
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algorithm that can be provided by the execution environment (EE);
—Recovery blocks allow different correct outputs from the alternates, while the
general-purpose character of the consensus algorithm of NVP calls for a single
correct output11.
The two models collapse when the acceptance test of recovery blocks is done as
in NVP, i.e., when the acceptance test is a consensus on the basis of the outputs of
the different alternates.
3.1.2.3 Conclusions. As with recovery blocks, also NVP has been successfully
adopted for many years in various application fields, including safety-critical air-
borne and spaceborne applications. The generic NVP architecture, based on redun-
dancy and consensus, addresses parallel and distributed applications written in any
programming paradigm. A generic, parameterisable architecture for real-time sys-
tems that supports the NVP strategy straightforwardly is GUARDS [Powell et al.
1999].
It is noteworthy to remark that the EE (also known as N -Version Executive)
is a complex component that needs to manage a number of basic functions, for
instance the execution of the decision algorithm, the assurance of input consistency
for all versions, the inter-version communication, the version synchronisation and
the enforcement of timing constraints [Aviz˘ienis 1995]. On the other hand, this
complexity is not part of the application software—the N versions—and it does not
need to be aware of the fault-tolerance strategy. An excellent degree of transparency
can be reached, thus guaranteeing a good value for attribute sc. Furthermore,
as mentioned in Sect. 2.3, costs and times required by a thorough verification,
validation, and testing of this architectural complexity may be acceptable, while
charging them to each application component is certainly not a cost-effective option.
Regarding attribute sa, the same considerations provided when describing re-
covery blocks hold for NVP: also in this case a single fault-tolerance strategy is
followed. For this reason we assess NVP as unsatisfactory regarding attribute sa.
Off-line adaptability to “bad” environments may be reached by increasing the
value of N—though this requires developing new versions—a costly activity for
both times and costs. Furthermore, the architecture does not allow any dynamic
management of the fault-tolerance provisions. We conclude that attribute a is
poorly addressed by NVP.
Portability is restricted by the portability of the EE and of each of the N versions.
Maintainability actions may also be problematic, as they need to be replicated
and validated N times—as well as performed according to the NVP paradigm,
11This weakness of NVP can be narrowed, if not solved, adopting the approach used in the so-
called “voting farm” [De Florio et al. 1998b; De Florio et al. 1998a; De Florio 1997b], a generic
voting tool designed by one of the authors of this paper in the framework of his participation to
project “EFTOS” (see Sect. 3.1.1.1): such a tool works with opaque objects that are compared by
means of a user-defined function. This function returns an integer value representing a “distance”
between any two objects to be voted. The user may choose between a set of predefined distance
functions or may develop an application-specific distance function. Doing the latter, a distance
may be endowed with the ability to assess that bitwise different objects are semantically equivalent.
Of course, the user is still responsible for supplying a bug-free distance function—though is assisted
in this simpler task by a number of template functions supplied with that tool.
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
Linguistic Structures of Application-level Fault-Tolerance · 19
so not to impact negatively on statistical independence of failures. Clearly the
same considerations apply to recovery blocks as well. In other words, the adoption
of multiple-version software fault-tolerance provisions always implies a penalty on
maintainability and portability.
Limited NVP support has been developed for “conventional” programming lan-
guages such as C. For instance, libft (see Sect. 3.1.1, p. 12) implements NVP as
follows:
#include <ftmacros.h>
...
NVP
VERSION{
block 1;
SENDVOTE(v_pointer, v_size);
}
VERSION{
block 2;
SENDVOTE(v_pointer, v_size);
}
...
ENDVERSION(timeout, v_size);
if (!agreeon(v_pointer)) error_handler();
ENDNVP;
Note that this particular implementation extinguishes the potential transparency
that in general characterises NVP, as it requires some non-functional code to be
included. This translates into an unsatisfactory value for attribute sc. Note also
that the execution of each block is in this case carried out sequentially.
It is important to remark how the adoption of NVP as a system structure for
ALFT requires a substantial increase in development and maintenance costs: both
1T/NH/NS and NT/1H/NS systems have a cost function growing quadratically
with N . The author of the NVP strategy remarks how such costs are paid back
by the gain in trustworthiness. This is certainly true when dealing with systems
possibly subjected to catastrophic failures—let us recall once more the case of the
Ariane 5 flight 501 [Inquiry Board Report 1996]. Nevertheless, the risks related to
the chances of rapid exhaustion of redundancy due to a burst of correlated failures
caused by a single or few design faults justify and call for the adoption of other
fault-tolerance provisions within and around the NVP unit in order to deal with
the case of a failed NVP unit.
Figure 6 synthesizes the main characteristics of the MV approach: several repli-
cas of (portions of) the functional code are produced and managed by a control
component. In recovery blocks this component is often coded side by side with the
functional code while in NVP this is usually a custom hardware box.
3.1.3 A hybrid case: Data Diversity. A special, hybrid case is given by data
diversity [Ammann and Knight 1988]. A data diversity system is a 1T/NH/1S
(less often a NT/1H/1S). It can be concisely described as an NVP system in
which N equal replicas are used as versions, but each replica receives a different
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Fig. 6. A fault-tolerant program according to a MV system.
minor perturbation of the input data. Under the hypothesis that the function
computed by the replicas is non chaotic, that is, it does not produce very different
output values when fed with slightly different inputs, data diversity may be a cost-
effective way to fault-tolerance. Clearly in this case the voting mechanism does
not run a simple majority voting but some vote fusion algorithm [Lorczak et al.
1989]. A typical application of data diversity is that of real time control programs,
where sensor re-sampling or a minor perturbation in the sampled sensor value may
be able to prevent a failure. Being substantially an NVP system, data diversity
reaches the same values for the structural attributes. The greatest advantage of this
technique is that of drastically decreasing design and maintenance costs, because
design diversity is avoided.
3.2 Metaobject Protocols and Reflection
Some of the negative aspects pointed out while describing single and multiple ver-
sion software approaches can be in some cases weakened, if not solved, by means of
a generic structuring technique which allows one to reach in some cases an adequate
degree of flexibility, transparency, and separation of design concerns: the adoption
of metaobject protocols (MOPs) [Kiczales et al. 1991]. The idea is to “open” the
implementation of the run-time executive of an object-oriented language such as
C++ or Java so that the developer can adopt and program different, custom se-
mantics, adjusting the language to the needs of the user and to the requirements
of the environment. Using MOPs, the programmer can modify the behaviour of
fundamental features such as methods invocation, object creation and destruction,
and member access. The transparent management of spatial and temporal redun-
dancy [Taylor et al. 1980] is a case where MOPs seem particularly adequate: for
instance, a MOP programmer may easily create “triple-redundant” memory cells
to protect his/her variables against transient faults as depicted in Fig. 7.
The key concept behind MOPs is that of computational reflection, or the causal
connection between a system and a meta-level description representing structural
and computational aspects of that system [Maes 1987]. MOPs offer the metalevel
programmer a representation of a system as a set of metaobjects, i.e., objects that
represent and reflect properties of “real” objects, i.e., those objects that constitute
the functional part of the user application. Metaobjects can for instance represent
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Fig. 7. A MOP may be used to realize, e.g., triple-redundant memories in a fully transparent way.
the structure of a class, or object interaction, or the code of an operation. This
mapping process is called reification [Robben 1999].
The causality relation of MOPs could also be extended to allow for a dynamical
reorganisation of the structure and the operation of a system, e.g., to perform
reconfiguration and error recovery. The basic object-oriented feature of inheritance
can be used to enhance the reusability of the FT mechanisms developed with this
approach.
3.2.1 Project FRIENDS. An architecture supporting this approach is the one
developed in the framework of project FRIENDS [Fabre and Pe´rennou 1996; Fabre
and Pe´rennou 1998]. The name FRIENDS stands for “flexible and reusable imple-
mentation environment for your next dependable system”. This project aims at
implementing a number of fault-tolerance provisions (e.g., replication, group-based
communication, synchronisation, voting. . . [Van Achteren 1997]) at meta-level. In
FRIENDS a distributed application is a set of objects interacting via the proxy
model, a proxy being a local intermediary between each object and any other (pos-
sibly replicated) object. FRIENDS uses the metaobject protocol provided by Open
C++, a C++ preprocessor that provides control over instance creation and deletion,
state access, and invocation of methods.
Other ALFT architectures, exploiting the concept of metaobject protocols within
custom programming languages, are reported in Sect. 3.3.
3.2.1.1 Conclusions. MOPs are indeed a promising system structure for em-
bedding different non-functional concerns in the application-level of a computer
program. MOPs work at language level, providing a means to modify the seman-
tics of basic object-oriented language building blocks such as object creation and
deletion, calling and termination of class methods, and so forth. This appears to
match perfectly to a proper subset of the possible fault-tolerance provisions, espe-
cially those such as transparent object redundancy that can be straightforwardly
managed with the metaobject approach. When dealing with these fault-tolerance
provisions, MOPs provide a perfect separation of the design concerns, i.e., opti-
mal sc. Some other techniques, specifically those who might be described as “the
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Fig. 8. A fault-tolerant program according to a MOP system.
most coarse-grained ones”, such as distributed recovery blocks [Kim and Welch
1989], appear to be less suited for being efficiently implemented via MOPs. These
techniques work at a distributed, macroscopic level.
Figure 8 synthesizes the main characteristics of the MOP approach: The fault-
tolerance programmer defines a number of metaobject protocols and associates
them with method invocations or other grammar cases. Each time the functional
program enters a certain grammar case, the corresponding protocol is transparently
executed. Each protocol has access to a representation of the system through its
metaobjects, by means of which it can also perform actions on the corresponding
“real” objects.
MOPs appear to constitute a promising technique for a transparent, coherent,
and effective adoption of some of the existing FT mechanisms and techniques. A
number of studies confirm that MOPs reach efficiency in some cases [Kiczales et al.
1991; Masuhara et al. 1992], though no experimental or analytical evidence allows so
far to estimate the practicality and the generality of this approach: “what reflective
capabilities are needed for what form of fault-tolerance, and to what extent these
capabilities can be provided in more-or-less conventional programming languages,
and allied to other structuring techniques [e.g. recovery blocks or NVP] remain to
be determined” [Randell and Xu 1995]. In other words, it is still an open question
whether MOPs represent a practical solution towards the effective integration of
most of the existing fault tolerance mechanisms in the user applications.
The above situation reminds the authors of another one, regarding the “quest”
for a novel computational paradigm for parallel processing which would be capa-
ble of dealing effectively with the widest class of problems, as the Von Neumann
paradigm does for sequential processing, though with the highest degree of effi-
ciency and the least amount of changes in the original (sequential) user code. In
that context, the concept of computational grain came up—some techniques were
inherently looking at the problem “with coarse-grained glasses,” i.e., at macro-
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scopic level, others were considering the problem exclusively at microscopical level.
One can conclude that MOPs offer an elegant system structure to embed a set of
non-functional services (including fault-tolerance provisions) in an object-oriented
program. It is still unclear whether this set is general enough to host, efficaciously,
many forms of fault-tolerance, as is remarked for instance in [Randell and Xu 1995;
Lippert and Videira Lopes 2000]. It is therefore difficult to establish a qualitative
assessment of attribute sa for MOPs.
The run-time management of libraries of MOPs may be used to reach satisfactory
values for attribute a. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this feature is not
present in any language supporting MOPs.
As evident, the target application domain is the one of object-oriented applica-
tions written with languages extended with a MOP, such as Open C++.
As a final remark, we observe how the cost of MOP-compliant fault-tolerant
software design should include those related to the acquisition of the extra compe-
tence and experience in MOP design tools, reification, and custom programming
languages.
3.3 Enhancing or Developing Fault-Tolerance Languages
Another approach is given by working at the language level enhancing a pre-existing
programming language or developing an ad hoc distributed programming language
so that it hosts specific fault-tolerance provisions. The following two sections cover
these topics.
3.3.1 Enhancing Pre-existing Programming Languages. Enhancing a pre-existing
programming language means augmenting the grammar of a wide-spread language
such as C or Pascal so that it directly supports features that can be used to enhance
the dependability of its programs, e.g., recovery blocks [Shrivastava 1978].
In the following, four classes of systems based on this approach are presented:
Arjuna, Sina, Linda, and FT-SR. All of them constitute provisions to develop
distributed fault-tolerant systems.
3.3.1.1 The Arjuna Distributed Programming System. Arjuna is an object-ori-
ented system for portable distributed programming in C++ [Parrington 1990; Shri-
vastava 1995]. It can be considered as a clever blending of useful and widespread
tools, techniques, and ideas—as such, it is a good example of the evolutionary
approach towards application-level software fault-tolerance. It exploits remote pro-
cedure calls [Birrell and Nelson 1984] and UNIX daemons. On each node of the
system an object server connects client objects to objects supplying services. The
object server also takes care of spawning objects when they are not yet running (in
this case they are referred to as “passive objects”). Arjuna also exploits a “nam-
ing service”, by means of which client objects request a service “by name”. This
transparency effectively supports object migration and replication.
As done in other systems, Arjuna makes use of stub generation to specify re-
mote procedure calls and remote manipulation of objects. A nice feature of this
system is that the stubs are derived automatically from the C++ header files of the
application, which avoids the need of a custom interface description language.
Arjuna offers the programmer means for dealing with atomic actions (via the
two-phase commit protocol) and persistent objects. The core class hierarchy of
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Arjuna appears to the programmer as follows [Parrington 1990]: StateManager
LockManager User-Defined Classes Lock User-Defined Lock Classes AtomicAction
AbstractRecord RecoveryRecord LockRecord and other management record types
etc.
Unfortunately, it requires the programmers to explicitly deal with tools to save
and restore the state, to manage locks, and to declare in their applications instances
of the class for managing atomic actions. As its authors state, in many respects
Arjuna asks the programmer to be aware of several complexities12—as such, it is
prejudicial to transparency and separation of design concerns. On the other hand,
its good design choices result in an effective, portable environment.
3.3.1.2 The SINA Extensions. The SINA [Aksit et al. 1991] object-oriented lan-
guage implements the so-called composition filters object model, a modular exten-
sion to the object model. In SINA, each object is equipped with a set of “filters”.
Messages sent to any object are trapped by the filters of that object. These filters
possibly manipulate the message before passing it to the object. SINA is a language
for composing such filters—its authors refer to it as a “composition filter language”.
It also supports meta-level programming through the reification of messages. The
concept of composition filters allows to implement several different “behaviours”
corresponding to different non-functional concerns. SINA has been designed for
being attached to existing languages: its first implementation, SINA/st, was for
Smalltalk. It has been also implemented for C++ [Glandrup 1995]—the extended
language has been called C++/CF. A preprocessor is used to translate a C++/CF
source into standard C++ code.
3.3.1.3 Fault-Tolerant Linda Systems. The Linda [Carriero and Gelernter 1989b;
Carriero and Gelernter 1989a] approach adopts a special model of communication,
known as generative communication [Gelernter 1985]. According to this model,
communication is still carried out through messages, though messages are not sent
to one or more addressees, and eventually read by these latter—on the contrary,
messages are included in a distributed (virtual) shared memory, called tuple space,
where every Linda process has equal read/write access rights. A tuple space is some
sort of a shared relational database for storing and withdrawing special data ob-
jects called tuples, sent by the Linda processes. Tuples are basically lists of objects
identified by their contents, cardinality and type. Two tuples match if they have
the same number of objects, if the objects are pairwise equal for what concerns
their types, and if the memory cells associated to the objects are bitwise equal.
A Linda process inserts, reads, and withdraws tuples via blocking or non-blocking
primitives. Reads can be performed supplying a template tuple—a prototype tuple
consisting of constant fields and of fields that can assume any value. A process
trying to access a missing tuple via a blocking primitive enters a wait state that
continues until any tuple matching its template tuple is added to the tuple space.
This allows processes to synchronise. When more than one tuple matches a tem-
12The Arjuna stub generator attempts to compensate for these problems are far as it can auto-
matically but there are cases where assistance from the programmer is required. For example,
heterogeneity is handled by converting all primitive types to a standard format understood by
both caller and receiver.
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plate, the choice of which actual tuple to address is done in a non-deterministic
way. Concurrent execution of processes is supported through the concept of “live
data structures”: tuples requiring the execution of one or more functions can be
evaluated on different processors—in a sense, they become active, or “alive”. Once
the evaluation has finished, a (no more active, or passive) output tuple is entered
in the tuple space.
Parallelism is implicit in Linda—there is no explicit notion of network, number
and location of the system processors, though Linda has been successfully employed
in many different hardware architectures and many applicative domains, resulting
in a powerful programming tool that sometimes achieves excellent speedups without
affecting portability issues. Unfortunately the model does not cover the possibil-
ity of failures—for instance, the semantics of its primitives are not well defined in
the case of a processor crash, and no fault-tolerance means are part of the model.
Moreover, in its original form, Linda only offers single-op atomicity [Bakken and
Schlichting 1995], i.e., atomic execution for only a single tuple space operation.
With single-op atomicity it is not possible to solve problems arising in two com-
mon Linda programming paradigms when faults occur: both the distributed vari-
able and the replicated-worker paradigms can fail [Bakken and Schlichting 1995].
As a consequence, a number of possible improvements have been investigated to
support fault-tolerant parallel programming in Linda. Apart from design choices
and development issues, many of them implement stability of the tuple space (via
replicated state machines [Schneider 1990] kept consistent via ordered atomic mul-
ticast [Birman et al. 1991]) [Bakken and Schlichting 1995; Xu and Liskov 1989;
Patterson et al. 1993], while others aim at combining multiple tuple-space opera-
tions into atomic transactions [Bakken and Schlichting 1995; Anderson and Shasha
1991; Cannon and Dunn 1992]. Other techniques have also been used, e.g., tu-
ple space checkpoint-and-rollback [Kambhatla 1991]. The authors also proposed
an augmented Linda model for solving inconsistencies related to failures occurring
in a replicated-worker environment and an algorithm for implementing a resilient
replicated worker strategy for message-passing farmer-worker applications. This al-
gorithm can mask failures affecting a proper subset of the set of workers [De Florio
et al. 1999].
Linda can be described as an extension that can be added to an existing pro-
gramming language. The greater part of these extensions requires a preproces-
sor translating the extension in the host language. This is the case, e.g., for
FT-Linda [Bakken and Schlichting 1995], PvmLinda [De Florio et al. 1994], C-
Linda [Berndt 1989], and MOM [Anderson and Shasha 1991]. A counterexample
is, e.g., the POSYBL system [Schoinas 1991], which implements Linda primitives
with remote procedure calls, and requires the user to supply the ancillary informa-
tion for distinguishing tuples.
3.3.1.4 FT-SR. FT-SR [Schlichting and Thomas 1995] is basically an attempt
to augment the SR [Andrews and Olsson 1993] distributed programming language
with mechanisms to facilitate fault-tolerance. FT-SR is based on the concept of
fail-stop modules (FSM). A FSM is defined as an abstract unit of encapsulation. It
consists of a number of threads that export a number of operations to other FSMs.
The execution of operations is atomic. FSM can be composed so to give rise to
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Fig. 9. A fault-tolerant program according to the enhanced language approach. Note how in this
case a translator decomposes the program into a SV system.
complex FSMs. For instance it is possible to replicate a module n > 1 times and set
up a complex FSM that can survive to n− 1 failures. Whenever a failure exhausts
the redundancy of a FSM, be it a simple or complex FSM, a failure notification
is automatically sent to a number of other FSMs so as to trigger proper recovery
actions. This feature explains the name of FSM: as in fail-stop processors, either
the system is correct or a notification is sent and the system stops its functions.
This means that the computing model of FT-SR guarantees, to some extent, that in
the absence of explicit failure notification, commands can be assumed to have been
processed correctly. This greatly simplifies program development because it masks
the occurrence of faults, offers guarantees that no erroneous results are produced,
and encourages the design of complex, possibly dynamic failure semantics (see
Sect. 2.3.1) based on failure notifications. Of course this strategy is fully effective
only under the hypothesis of perfect failure detection coverage—an assumption that
sometimes may be found to be false.
3.3.1.5 Conclusions. Figure 9 synthesizes the main characteristics of the en-
hanced language approach: A compiler or, as in the picture, a translator, produces
a new fault-tolerant program. In the case in the picture the translated program
belongs to class SV (see Sect. 3.1.1). Note how few clearly identifiable “FT” exten-
sions are translated into larger sections of fault-tolerant code. As characteristics of
an SV system, this fault-tolerant code is indistinguishable from the functional code
of the application.
We can conclude by stating that the approach of designing fault-tolerance en-
hancements for a pre-existing programming language does imply an explicit code
intrusion: The extensions are designed with the explicit purpose to host a number
of fault-tolerance provisions within the single source code. We observe, though,
that being explicit, this code intrusion is such that the fault-tolerant code is gen-
erally easy to locate and distinguish from the functional code of the application.
Hence, attribute sc may be positively assessed for systems belonging to this cat-
egory. Following a similar reasoning and observing Fig. 9 we can conclude that
the design and maintenance costs of this approach are in general less than those
characterising SV.
On the contrary, the problem of hosting an adequate structure for ALFT can be
complicated by the syntax constraints in the hosting language. This may prevent
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incorporation of a wide set of fault-tolerance provisions within a same syntactical
structure. One can conclude that in this case attribute sa does not reach satisfac-
tory values—at least for the examples considered in this section.
Enhancing a pre-existing language is an evolutionary approach: in so doing,
portability problems are weakened—especially when the extended grammar is trans-
lated into the plain grammar, e.g., via a preprocessor—and can be characterised by
good execution efficiency [Anderson et al. 1985; Schlichting and Thomas 1995].
The approach is generally applicable, though the application must be written (or
rewritten) using the enhanced language. Its adaptability (attribute a) is in general
unsatisfactory, because at run-time the fault-tolerant code is indistinguishable from
the functional code.
As a final observation, we remark how the four cases that have been dealt with in
Sect. 3.3.1 all stem from the domain of distributed/concurrent programming, which
shows the important link between fault tolerance issues and distributed computing.
3.3.2 Developing Novel Fault-Tolerance Programming Languages. The adoption
of a custom-made language especially conceived to write fault-tolerant distributed
software is discussed in the rest of this subsection.
3.3.2.1 ARGUS. Argus [Liskov 1988] is a distributed object-oriented program-
ming language and operating system. Argus was designed to support application
programs such as banking systems. To capture the object-oriented nature of such
programs, it provides a special kind of objects, called guardians, which perform
user-definable actions in response to remote requests. To solve the problems of
concurrency and failures, Argus allows computations to run as atomic transactions.
Argus’ target application domain is the one of transaction processing.
3.3.2.2 The Correlate Language. The Correlate object-oriented language [Robben
1999] adopts the concept of an active object, defined as an object that has control
over the synchronisation of incoming requests from other objects. Objects are active
in the sense that they do not process their requests immediately—they may decide
to delay a request until it is accepted, i.e., until a given precondition (a guard) is
met—for instance, a mailbox object may refuse a new message in its buffer until
an entry becomes available in it. The precondition is a function of the state of
the object and the invocation parameters—it does not imply interaction with other
objects and has no side effects. If a request cannot be served according to an ob-
ject’s precondition, it is saved into a buffer until it becomes serviceable, or until
the object is destroyed. Conditions such as an overflow in the request buffer are
not dealt with in [Robben 1999]. If more than a single request becomes serviceable
by an object, the choice is made non-deterministically. Correlate uses a commu-
nication model called “pattern-based group communication”—communication goes
from an “advertising object” to those objects that declare their “interest” in the
advertised subject. This is similar to Linda’s model of generative communication,
introduced in Sect. 3.3.1.3. Objects in Correlate are autonomous, in the sense that
they may not only react to external stimuli but also give rise to autonomous oper-
ations motivated by an internal “goal”. When invoking a method, the programmer
can choose to block until the method is fully executed (this is called synchronous
interaction), or to execute it “in the background” (asynchronous interaction). Cor-
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relate supports MOPs. It has been effectively used to offer transparent support for
transaction, replication, and checkpoint-and-rollback. The first implementation of
Correlate consists of a translator to plain Java plus an execution environment, also
written in Java.
3.3.2.3 Fault-Tolerance Attribute Grammars. The system models for application-
level software fault-tolerance encountered so far all have their basis in an imperative
language. A different approach is based on the use of functional languages. This
choice translates into a program structure that allows a straightforward inclusion
of a means for fault-tolerance, with high degrees of transparency and flexibility.
Functional models that appear particularly interesting as system structures for soft-
ware fault-tolerance are those based on the concept of attribute grammars [Paakki
1995]. This paragraph briefly introduces the model known as FTAG (fault-tolerant
attribute grammars) [Suzuki et al. 1996], which offers the designer a large set of
fault-tolerance mechanisms. A noteworthy aspect of FTAG is that its authors ex-
plicitly address the problem of providing a syntactical model for the widest possible
set of fault-tolerance provisions and paradigms, developing coherent abstractions
of those mechanisms while maintaining the linguistic integrity of the adopted nota-
tion. in other words, optimising the value of attribute sa is one of the design goals
of FTAG.
FTAG regards a computation as a collection of pure mathematical functions
known as modules. Each module has a set of input values, called inherited at-
tributes, and of output variables, called synthesised attributes. Modules may refer
to other modules. When modules do not refer to any other module, they can be
performed immediately. Such modules are called primitive modules. On the other
hand, non-primitive modules require other modules to be performed first—as a con-
sequence, an FTAG program is executed by decomposing a “root” module into its
basic submodules and then applying this decomposition process recursively to each
of the submodules. This process goes on until all primitive modules are encoun-
tered and executed. The execution graph is clearly a tree called computation tree.
This approach presents many benefits, e.g., as the order in which modules are de-
composed is exclusively determined by attribute dependencies among submodules,
a computation tree can be turned straightforwardly into a parallel process.
The linguistic structure of FTAG allows the integration of a number of useful
fault-tolerance features that address the whole range of faults—design, physical,
and interaction faults. One of these features is called redoing. Redoing replaces a
portion of the computation tree with a new computation. This is useful for instance
to eliminate the effects of a portion of the computation tree that has generated an
incorrect result, or whose executor has crashed. It can be used to implement easily
“retry blocks” and recovery blocks by adding ancillary modules that test whether
the original module behaved consistently with its specification and, if not, give rise
to a “redoing”, a recursive call to the original module.
Another relevant feature of FTAG is its support for replication, a concept that
in FTAG translates into a decomposition of a module into N identical submodules
implementing the function to replicate. Such approach is known as replicated de-
composition, while involved submodules are called replicas. Replicas are executed
according to the usual rules of decomposition, though only one of the generated
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Fig. 10. A fault-tolerant program according to a FTAG system.
results is used as the output of the original module. Depending on the chosen fault-
tolerance strategy, this output can be, e.g., the first valid output or the output of
a demultiplexing function, e.g., a voter. It is worth remarking that no syntactical
changes are needed, only a subtle extension of the interpretation so to allow the
involved submodules to have the same set of inherited attributes and to generate a
collated set of synthesised attributes.
FTAG stores its attributes in a stable object base or in primary memory depend-
ing on their criticality—critical attributes can then be transparently retrieved from
the stable object base after a failure. Object versioning is also used, a concept that
facilitates the development of checkpoint-and-rollback strategies.
FTAG provides a unified linguistic structure that effectively supports the de-
velopment of fault-tolerant software. Conscious of the importance of supporting
the widest possible set of fault-tolerance means, its authors report in the cited pa-
per how they are investigating the inclusion of other fault-tolerance features and
trying to synthesise new expressive syntactical structures for FTAG—thus further
improving attribute sa.
Unfortunately, the widespread adoption of this valuable tool is conditioned by
the limited acceptance and spread of the functional programming paradigm outside
of academia.
3.3.2.4 Conclusions. Synthesizing in a single meaningful picture the main char-
acteristics of the approach that makes use of custom fault-tolerance languages is
very difficult, for the design freedom translates into entities that may have few
points in common. Figure 10 for instance synthesizes the characteristics of FTAG.
The ad hoc development of a fault-tolerance programming language allows op-
timal values of attribute sa to be reached in some cases. The explicit, controlled
intrusion of fault-tolerant code explicitly encourages the adoption of high-level fault-
tolerance provisions and requires dependability-aware design processes, which trans-
lates into a positive assessment for attribute sc. On the contrary, with the same
reasoning of Sect. 3.3.1, attribute a can be in general assessed as unsatisfactory13.
13In the case of FTAG, though, one could design a run-time interpreter that dynamically “decides”
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The target application domain for this approach is restricted by the character-
istics of the hosting language and of its programming model. Obviously this also
requires the application to be (re-)written using the hosting language. The acqui-
sition of know-how in novel design paradigms and languages is likely to have an
impact on development costs.
3.4 Aspect-oriented Programming Languages
Aspect-oriented programming (AOP) [Kiczales et al. 1997] is a programming method-
ology and a structuring technique that explicitly addresses, at a system-wide level,
the problem of the best code structure to express different, possibly conflicting
design goals such as high performance, optimal memory usage, and dependability.
Indeed, when coding a non-functional service within an application—for instance
a system-wide error handling protocol—using either a procedural or an object-
oriented programming language, one is required to decompose the original goal, in
this case a certain degree of dependability, into a multiplicity of fragments scattered
among a number of procedures or objects. This happens because those program-
ming languages only provide abstraction and composition mechanisms to cleanly
support the functional concerns. In other words, specific non-functional goals, such
as high performance, cannot be easily captured into a single unit of functional-
ity among those offered by a procedural or object-oriented language, and must be
fragmented and intruded into the available units of functionality. As already ob-
served, this code intrusion is detrimental to maintainability and portability of both
functional and non-functional services (the latter called “aspects” in AOP terms).
These aspects tend to crosscut the system’s class and module structure rather than
staying, well localised, within one of these unit of functionality, e.g., a class. This
increases the complexity of the resulting systems.
The main idea of AOP is to use:
(1) A “conventional” language (that is, a procedural, object-oriented, or functional
programming language) to code the basic functionality. The resulting program
is called component program. The program’s basic functional units are called
components.
(2) A so-called aspect-oriented language to implement given aspects by defining
specific interconnections (“aspect programs” in AOP lingo) among the compo-
nents in order to address various systemic concerns.
(3) An aspect weaver, that takes as input both the aspect and the component
programs and produces with those (“weaves”) an output program (“tangled
code”) that addresses specific aspects.
The weaver first generates a data flow graph from the component program. In
this graph, nodes represent components, and edges represent data flowing from one
component to another. Next, it executes the aspect programs. These programs edit
the graph according to specific goals, collapsing nodes together and adjusting the
corresponding code accordingly. Finally, a code generator takes the graph resulting
from the previous step as its input and translates it into an actual software package
the “best” values for the parameters of the fault-tolerance provisions being executed—where “best”
refers to the current environmental conditions.
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written, e.g., for a procedural language such as C. This package is only meant to
be compiled and produce the ultimate executable code fulfilling a specific aspect
such as, e.g., higher dependability.
In a sense, AOP systematically automatises and supports the process to adapt
an existing code so that it fulfils specific aspects. AOP may be defined as a software
engineering methodology supporting those adaptations in such a way that they do
not destroy the original design and do not increase complexity. The original idea
of AOP is a clever blending and generalisation of the ideas that are at the basis,
for instance, of optimising compilers, program transformation systems, MOPs, and
of literate programming [Knuth 1984].
3.4.1 AspectJ. AspectJ is probably the very first example of aspect-oriented
language [Kiczales 2000; Lippert and Videira Lopes 2000]. Developed as a Xerox
PARC project, AspectJ can be defined as an aspect-oriented extension to the Java
programming language. AspectJ provides its users with the concept of a “join
points”, i.e., relevant points in a program’s dynamic call graph. Join points are
those that mark the code regions that can be manipulated by an aspect weaver (see
above). In AspectJ, these points can be
—method executions,
—constructor calls,
—constructor executions,
—field accesses, and
—exception handlers.
Another extension to Java is AspectJ’s support of the Design by Contract method-
ology [Meyer 1997], where contracts [Hoare 1969] define a set of pre-conditions,
post-conditions, and invariants, that determine how to use and what to expect
from a computational entity.
A study has been carried out on the capability of AspectJ as an AOP language
supporting exception detection and handling [Lippert and Videira Lopes 2000]. It
has been shown how AspectJ can be used to develop so-called “plug-and-play”
exception handlers: libraries of exception handlers that can be plugged into many
different applications. This translates into better support for managing different
configurations at compile-time. This addresses one of the aspects of attribute a
defined in Sect. 2.3.
3.4.2 AspectWerkz. Recently a new stream of research activity has been devoted
to dynamic AOP. An interesting example of this trend is AspectWerkz [Bone´r and
Vasseur 2004; Vasseur 2004], defined by its authors as “a dynamic, lightweight and
high-performant AOP framework for Java” [Bone´r 2004]. AspectWerkz utilizes
bytecode modification to weave classes at project build-time, class load time or
runtime. This capability means that the actual semantics of an AspectWerkz code
may vary dynamically over time, e.g., as a response to environmental changes. This
translates into good support towards a.
Recently the AspectJ and AspectWerkz projects have agreed to work together
as one team to produce a single aspect-oriented programming platform building on
their complementary strengths and expertise.
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Fig. 11. A fault-tolerant program according to an AOP system.
3.4.3 AspectC++. A recent project, AspectC++ [Spinczyk et al. 2005; As-
pectCpp ], proposes an aspect-oriented implementation of C++ which appears
to achieve most of the positive properties of the other Java-based approaches and
adds to this efficiency and good performance.
3.4.4 Conclusions. Figure 11 synthesizes the main characteristics of AOP: it
allows to decompose, select, and assemble components according to different design
goals. This has been represented by drawing the components as pieces of a jigsaw
puzzle created by the aspect program and assembled by the weaver into the ac-
tual source code. AOP addresses explicitly code re-engineering, which in principle
should allow to reduce considerably maintenance costs.
AOP is a relatively recent approach to software development. AOP can in princi-
ple address any application domain and can use a procedural, functional or object-
oriented programming language as component language. The isolation and coding
of aspects requires extra work and expertise that may be well payed back by the
capability of addressing new aspects while keeping a single unmodified and general
design. This said, we must remark how some researchers questioned the adequacy
of AOP as an effective paradigm for handling failure—at least for the domain of
transaction processing [Kienzle and Guerraou 2002].
For the time being it is not yet possible to tell whether AOP will spread out as
a programming paradigm among academia and industry the way object-oriented
programming has done since the Eighties. The many qualities of AOP are currently
being quantitatively assessed, both with theoretical studies and with practical ex-
perience, and results seem encouraging. Furthermore, evidence of an increasing
interest in AOP is given by the large number of research papers and conferences
devoted to this interesting subject.
From the point of view of the dependability aspect, one can observe that AOP
exhibits optimal sc (“by construction”, in a sense [Kiczales and Mezini 2005]),
and that recent results show that attribute a can in principle reach good values
when making use of run-time weaving [Vasseur 2004], often realized by dynamic
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bytecode manipulation. The work by Ostermann [1999] is an interesting survey on
this subject.
The adequacy at fulfilling attribute sa is indeed debatable also because, to date,
no fault-tolerance aspect languages have been devised14—which may possibly be
an interesting research domain.
3.5 The Recovery Meta-Program
The Recovery Meta-Program (RMP) [Ancona et al. 1990] is a mechanism that al-
ternates the execution of two cooperating processing contexts. The concept behind
its architecture can be captured by means of the idea of a debugger, or a monitor,
which:
—is scheduled when the application is stopped at some breakpoints,
—executes some program, written in a specific language,
—and finally returns the control to the application context, until the next break-
point is encountered.
Breakpoints outline portions of code relevant to specific fault-tolerance strategies—
for instance, breakpoints can be used to specify alternate blocks or acceptance tests
of recovery blocks (see Sect. 3.1.2.1)—while programs are implementations of those
strategies, e.g., of recovery blocks or N -version programming. The main benefit of
RMP is in the fact that, while breakpoints require a (minimal) intervention of the
functional-concerned programmer, RMP scripts can be designed and implemented
without the intervention and even the awareness of the developer. In other words,
RMP guarantees a good separation of design concerns. As an example, Fig. 12
shows how recovery blocks can be implemented in RMP:
—When the system encounters a breakpoint corresponding to the entrance of a
recovery block, control flows to the RMP, which saves the application program
environment and starts the first alternate.
—The execution of the first alternate goes on until its end, marked by another
breakpoint. The latter returns the control to RMP, this time in order to execute
the acceptance test.
—Should the test succeed, the recovery block is exited, otherwise control goes to
the second alternate, and so forth.
Note how the fault-tolerance development costs here are basically those for specify-
ing the alternates and acceptance tests, while the remaining complexity is charged
to the RMP architecture entirely.
In RMP, the language to express the meta-programs is Hoare’s Communicating
Sequential Processes language [Hoare 1978] (CSP).
14For instance, AspectJ only addresses exception error detection and handling. Remarkably
enough, the authors of a study on AspectJ and its support to this field conclude [Lippert and
Videira Lopes 2000] that “whether the properties of AspectJ [documented in this paper] lead
to programs with fewer implementation errors and that can be changed easier, is still an open
research topic that will require serious usability studies as AOP matures”.
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Fig. 12. Control flow between the application program and RMP while executing a fault-tolerance
strategy based on recovery blocks.
Fig. 13. A fault-tolerant program according to the RMP system.
3.6 Conclusions
Figure 9 synthesizes the main characteristics of RMP: The fault-tolerance code is
in this case both logically and physically distinct from the functional code, which
means that the coding complexity and costs are considerably reduced.
In the RMP approach, all the technicalities related to the management of the
fault-tolerance provisions are coded in a separate programming context. Even the
language to code the provisions may be different from the one used to express the
functional aspects of the application. One can conclude that RMP is characterised
by optimal sc.
The design choice of using CSP to code the meta-programs influences attribute
sa negatively. Choosing a pre-existent formalism clearly presents many practical
advantages, though it means adopting a fixed, immutable syntactical structure to
express the fault-tolerance strategies. The choice of a pre-existing general-purpose
distributed programming language such as CSP is therefore questionable, as it
appears to be rather difficult or at least cumbersome to use it to express at least
some of the fault-tolerance provisions. For instance, RMP proves to be an effective
linguistic structure to express strategies such as recovery blocks and N -version
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Section Approach sc sa a
3.1.1 SV poor very limited poor
3.1.2 MV (recovery blocks) poor poor poor
3.1.2 MV (NVP) good poor poor
3.2 MOP optimal positive? positive
3.3.1 EL positive poor poor
3.3.2 DL positive optimal poor
3.4 AOP optimal positive? good
3.5 RMP optimal very limited positive
Table I. A summary of the qualitative assessments proposed in Sect. 3. MV has been differenti-
ated into recovery blocks (RB) and NVP. EL is the approach of Sect. 3.3.1, while DL is that of
Sect. 3.3.2.
programming, where the main components are coarse grain processes to be arranged
into complex fault-tolerance structures. Because of the choice of a pre-existing
language such as CSP, RMP appears not to be the best choice for representing
provisions such as, e.g., atomic actions [Jalote and Campbell 1985]. This translates
into very limited sa.
Our conjecture is that the coexistence of two separate layers for the functional
and the non-functional aspects could have been better exploited to reach the best
of the two approaches: using a widespread programming language such as, e.g., C,
for expressing the functional aspect, while devising a custom language for dealing
with non-functional requirements, e.g., a language especially designed to express
error recovery strategies.
Satisfactory values for attribute a cannot be reached with the only RMP system
developed so far, because it does not foresee any dynamic management of the
executable code. Nevertheless it is definitely possible to design systems in which,
e.g., the recovery metaprogram changes dynamically so as to compensate changes
in the environment or other changes. This is the strategy used in [De Florio and
Blondia 2005] to set up a system structure for adaptive mobile applications. Hence
we chose to evaluate as positive the value of a for the RMP approach.
RMP appears to be characterised by a large overhead due to frequent context
switching between the main application and the recovery metaprogram [Randell
and Xu 1995]. Run-time requirements may be jeopardised by these large overheads,
especially when it is difficult to establish time bounds for their extent. No other
restrictions appear to be posed by RMP on the target application domain.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Five classes of system structures for ALFT have been described and critically re-
viewed, qualitatively, with respect to the structural attributes sc, sa, and a. Ta-
ble I summarises the results of this survey providing a comparison of the various
approaches. As can be seen from those summaries, no single approach exists today
that provide an optimal solution to the problems cumulatively referred to as the
system structure for application-level fault-tolerance. We are currently working
towards the definition of new models for application-level fault-tolerance reaching
high values of the three attributes. A prototypic system is described in [De Florio
and Blondia 2007b].
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This paper has also highlighted the positive and negative aspects of the evolu-
tionary solution—using a pre-existing language—with respect to a “revolutionary”
approach—based on devising a custom made, ad hoc language. As a consequence
of these observations, it has been conjectured how using an approach based on two
languages—one covering the functional concerns and the other covering the fault-
tolerance concerns—it may be possible to address, within one efficacious linguistic
structure, the widest set of fault-tolerance provisions, thus providing optimal val-
ues for the three structural attributes. This conjecture is currently under verifica-
tion [De Florio and Blondia 2005] in the framework of European project ARFLEX
(“Adaptive Robots for Flexible Manufacturing Systems”) and IBBT project QoE
(“End-to-end Quality of Experience”).
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